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Introduction 
 All of humanity holds a stake in the future of politics. No matter one’s country of 
origin, economic circumstance, racial or cultural identity, or beliefs, the reality of 
political decisions, public policies and laws drastically influence the day to day lives of 
all people. This notion holds especially true as the United States undergoes a confusing 
and problematic shift in the nature of its political developments. With the election of 
Donald Trump to the Presidency in 2016, the country, its citizens, and the entire world 
have borne witness to a political reality in which a bigot with no political experience or 
knowledge has become the most powerful political figure in the entire world. President 
Trump’s rise to such a position is perplexing and troublesome to those across the political 
spectrum of extremist conservative to extremist liberal. Yet, even more so are the 
horrifying similarities between his leadership style with that of past dictatorial regimes. 
 The current reality of President Trump is one that leads us to ask ourselves what 
politics can mean, and what it should mean for the future. Throughout history, numerous 
academics, political theorists and philosophers have debated and laid claims as to the 
purpose of politics and political power. Many such individuals, including Thomas 
Hobbes and Max Weber, have identified the true meaning of politics as obedience and 
domination over others. However, as I demonstrate, such an interpretation is incredibly 
dangerous, closely aligning with the historical values of authoritarian and totalitarian 
governments. With the falsification of this previously supposed political truth, we realize 
there is something else that must be at the heart of what it means to practice good politics.  
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 Hannah Arendt provides a clear answer to this dilemma. Perhaps the most 
acclaimed political theorist in all of human history, this twentieth century thinker is most 
well known for her theories on oppression, freedom, political action, and specifically, 
totalitarianism. An extensive analysis of her many literary works exposes a much more 
productive explanation of politics than the presupposed acceptance of obedience and 
totalitarian power. Instead of these concepts, we discover that truly good politics can be 
achieved only through the realization and actualization of equality. This discovery pushes 
us to explore the ways in which such a form of politics can be achieved. As introduced by 
Weber and reconciled by Arendt, this golden key to this political utopia lies within the 
personal. Aspects of the personal — the internal characteristics and personal traits of the 
individual—  is what ultimately influences the ability of the human to practice good 
politics. With this insight, we recognize that Arendt’s humanistic concept of ‘plurality’ 
can shed light on how true politics can be achieved within society. Further, through such 
recognition, we are able to illuminate the problematic nature of the US’ modern political 
reality beneath the power of Donald Trump, as well as the dangers that the world faces 
underneath the authority of such a personality. 
What Does It Mean To Practice ‘Good’ Politics? 
 Before attempting to identify how to achieve ‘good’ politics, we must first find 
some clarity as to what good politics means and what the purpose of politics actually is. 
To do so, I shall examine some of the most influential political theorists of all time, 
beginning with one of the earliest modern philosophers: Thomas Hobbes. Although I do 
not agree with Hobbes’ interpretation of politics, his theories provide an important 
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jumping off point from which we can determine how to proceed with our analysis; often, 
it is just as productive to determine what something is not, as it is to determine what 
something is. As such, the exploration of Hobbes’ flawed theoretical teachings work as an 
excellent platform in which we can determine what politics should not be.  
 An Englishman of the 17th century, Hobbes’ academic explorations were often 
grounded within questions of societal, and thus, political, organization. Hobbes expressed 
a clear interest in exploring how human beings might be able to live together peacefully 
and avoid violence. Inspired by political unrest and conflict within his own community 
— events now identified as the English Civil Wars — Hobbes believed that civil war was 
primarily instigated by a communal disagreement regarding the commonwealth’s 
authority (Finn). It was during this period of English civil unrest that Hobbes wrote one 
of the most influential and highly regarded pieces of literature on statecraft: Leviathan.  
 In Leviathan, Hobbes explains that the need for humans to form political societies 
is rooted in our own equally problematic nature. Hobbes posits that all humans share an 
abundance of incredibly aggressive and violent qualities, and thus, it is dangerous when 
we are allowed or given the freedom to behave according to these natural instincts. 
Hobbes states that all men are likely to engage in violence on account of three main 
issues. One, the competition of securing some commodity; two, the protection and 
defense of said commodity from the advancement of others; three, a search for personal 
glory in the eyes of others (88). In these ways, humans are interpreted as greedy, violent, 
self preserving entities with no regard for others’ well-being. We do not seem to be 
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depicted as intelligent social creatures with consciences. Instead, we are all simple-
minded and heartless, on a quest to protect one thing: ourselves. 
 Hobbes embellishes the natural inclinations of man by introducing the concept of 
the “state of nature.” The state of nature describes the original organization of the world 
as a space in which man has the ability to act on his personal desires of inevitable 
external destruction in the name of internal preservation. As such, the state of nature 
exists in a nonpolitical, or a-political context, where there are no rules to enforce man to 
behave otherwise. Thus ensues a state of chaos, in which every individual is perpetually 
at war with everyone else. This does not necessarily refer to literal warfare, but to the 
continuous disposition of mankind to engage in aggression with each other. Here we 
arrive at Hobbes’ infamous words claiming that the natural, un-manipulated life of man is 
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short (93)” Such a life evokes a constant sense of 
danger that is not particularly appealing to mankind. As a result, as Hobbes suggests, 
mankind chooses to remove itself from the state of nature in search of something more 
safe and secure. 
 Due to this continuous state of violence, Hobbes’ primordial humans arrive at the 
position that in order to remove one’s self from the state of nature, mankind requires 
organized societal structures to keep him in place and dictate his behaviors so that he will 
not — and cannot — act according to his nature. In order for such structures to succeed, 
Hobbes finds that it is only logical to create and enter into social contracts with one 
another — which inevitably leads to the creation of the political state. A “social contract,” 
in Hobbes’ terms, is an agreement entered into by members of society, which confirms 
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that by living in a community, they will willingly adhere to its imposed rules and policies, 
such as respect for another’s property or body (94). Such an agreement works to the 
advantage of all members, as all receive guaranteed protection of their properties (and 
selves) by the state in exchange for cooperating with its laws. For example, if citizen A 
steals a possession of citizen B, or goes so far as to murder citizen B (assuming both of 
these acts are against the law) the state will interfere to protect citizen B and remove 
citizen A from society (i.e. prison). Thus, through the arrangement of social contracts, we 
find ourselves exiting the state of nature in return for the promised security of 
governmental implementation. Of course, this requires the forfeiture of some liberties — 
such as that to murder another individual, or steal one’s property — but most will find 
this is a fair trade that is worth it to make. 
 Though this serves as a guideline for all types of political organizations in 
general, “social contract theory” does not necessarily try to maintain that one type of rule 
is best. Whether a dictatorship or a democracy, what remains most important for social 
communities comes down to one political action: obedience. If, Hobbes claims, citizens 
are not obedient in regards to the laws and rules that the government puts in place, the 
community will not survive. Hobbes suggests that in order for such artificial political 
structures to succeed, citizens must exhibit and continuously practice obedience to their 
state’s laws and customs. Hobbes notes:  
“For the prosperity of a People ruled by an Aristocraticall, or Democraticall assembly, 
cometh not from Aristocracy, nor from Democracy, but from the Obedience...nor do the 
people flourish in a Monarchy because one man has the right to rule them, but because 
they obey him. Take away in any kind of State, the Obedience...and they shall not only not 
flourish, but in short time be dissolved” (233). 
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Here we arrive at a key point of interest for the purpose of my analysis. For Hobbes, the 
central concern of politics is the unwavering obedience of the people to the power of the 
sovereign and the laws that it chooses to enforce. Individuals must remain compliant and 
controllable so that they may be governed in a way that maintains peace and order for 
society. Hobbes thus implies a fear that without such obedience, our social contracts will 
lose their sense of validity, and we will be thrust back into our pre-historic state of nature 
once again. As I will demonstrate, however, this assumption is a grave mistake for the 
future of human wellbeing and political organization. 
 Max Weber is another important individual in political thought who demonstrates 
a similarly flawed understanding of politics. In fact, Weber’s original thinking regarding 
political realism has led many academics to compare his theories with that of Hobbes. 
Additionally, as with Hobbes, such theories continue to influence the world of politics 
today. A Prussian born several generations later than Hobbes (1864 - 1920), Weber is one 
of, if not the, most important and influential social theorist of the 20th century (Kim). 
Weber’s academic works contribute to a variety of disciplines, ranging from religion, 
economics and sociology to politics — though we are most interested in the latter. In 
order to better understand Weber’s political ideologies, we shall explore his 1921 lecture 
at Munich University, which was later published as the literary work, Politics As A 
Vocation.  
 In Weber’s 1921 lecture, Weber sets out to answer the question of what it can (and 
does) mean to participate in politics as a profession so that he may better understand the 
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political leadership of the state. Before diving into this exploration, however, Weber 
solidifies his understanding of the state, and therefore politics, as quite similarly to that of 
Hobbes — and equally problematic. According to Weber, politics is about domination, 
obedience, and the assertion of power — all of which cannot be obtained without the use 
of legitimate force. To begin, he identifies the state as a social structure imperative to the 
societal life of mankind, which organizes and facilitates total political “domination” over 
the communal body (80). In Weber’s eyes, all political institutions, including the state, 
exclusively exist as social spaces where men must necessarily realize their domination 
over other men. In order to succeed in achieving such domination, the state must assert 
force. Weber explains that a state is a human community which “(successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (77). Weber 
notes that although violence is not necessarily the ‘normal’ means utilized by the state, 
physical force is a legitimate tool that remains specific to it. Thus, we are faced with the 
second key piece to Weber’s theory of the state: its political organization of total 
authority is specifically founded upon force, and without such, its leadership, and thus 
power, would cease to exist.  
 To continue, Weber asserts that in order for the state’s organized domination to 
succeed, citizens must be trained to act as obedient machines towards those superior 
leaders who act as the dominators. Weber states that “human conduct [must] be 
conditioned to obedience towards those masters who claim to be the bearers of legitimate 
power” (78). Weber is referring to personal executive staff (who must cooperate with the 
leaders in order to enforce orders and assert control over citizens) as well as the actual 
!  of !7 39
citizens themselves (whom the state’s domination will be enacted upon). Additionally, in 
a tone incredibly reminiscent of Hobbes, Weber expresses anxiety that the state will cease 
to exist in lieu of anarchy if those who are dominated do not “obey the authority claimed 
by the powers that be” (77). Thus, through Weber’s political lens, we examine politics in 
a way which over-emphasizes the importance of political obedience and docility to the 
problematic extent that Hobbes does — and thus evokes the same political concerns as to 
the implications for totalitarianism and dictatorship. This is, of course, an extremely 
problematic point in Weber’s thinking — one which, as with Hobbes, I am incredibly 
reluctant to accept. 
 To elaborate on this point further, we shall analyze one particular quote in which 
Weber undeniably advocates for the passivity of citizens towards an authoritative and 
totalitarian-esque ruler. Weber states: 
“The honor of the civil servant is vested in his ability to execute conscientiously the order 
of the superior authorities, exactly as if the order agreed with his own conviction. This 
holds even if the order appears wrong to him and if, despite the civil servant’s 
remonstrances, the authority insists on the order. Without this moral discipline and self-
denial, in the highest sense, the whole apparatus would fall to pieces” (87, emphasis 
mine). 
In this quote, Weber blatantly encourages civil servants to blindly follow the political 
leader. Even if one’s personal ethics and moral obligations do not coincide with that of 
the sovereign, the “honorable” individual will execute the sovereign’s wishes without the 
slightest hesitation, as if such execution is of his own volition. In this way, Weber argues 
for the sovereign’s administrative staff to ignore their own moral compass, to not think 
critically for themselves, or stand up for what they believe in — a materialization of self 
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denial which Weber peculiarly rewards as a “moral discipline,” though one is in fact 
ignoring their morale. This line of thinking is particularly concerning given the events of 
the Holocaust, in which administrative officials (such as Adolf Eichmann) carelessly 
followed Hitler’s antisemitic orders, even though such individuals did not necessarily 
hold the same beliefs. Such inattentive behavior is precisely what led to the genocide of 
millions of Jewish citizens — and cannot be condoned as simply part of ‘doing one’s job’ 
for the social and political order of society. In total, Weber’s understanding of politics 
boils down to one major concept: forceful domination. Similar to Hobbes, such a 
conclusion exposes an extremely problematic understanding of politics at its most basic, 
and leads us in the inherently destructive direction of totalitarianism. It is far too 
dangerous to define politics through the lens of Hobbes or Weber. 
 Hobbes’ and Weber’s decisions to emphasize obedience is the fatal flaw in their 
theoretical approaches to politics. Ironically, although Hobbes sets out to explain the 
organization of a community which might avoid the constant use of violence that is 
exhibited in the state of nature, such explanations of politics are incredibly dangerous in 
their many shared similarities with the very political structures that are the most violent 
and troublesome of all: dictatorships. Ultimately, if obedience is to be recognized as the 
true basis of politics, then we must in turn accept the numerous historical (and modern) 
accounts of genocide, violence, fear, oppression, and destruction that mass societal 
obedience has and will continue to evoke in the name of totalitarianism. By embracing 
obedience as one in the same as politics, we are embracing the problematic nature of 
authoritarian regimes that employ such methods and harm their population by doing so. 
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By encouraging the body-politic to blindly follows its leader, we reify and reinforce the 
validity of totalitarianism and tyranny as valued political arrangements. Is this a world 
that we want to live in? Where the central goal of politics might be the reign of a Hitler, a 
Stalin, a Mussolini, a Franco? Should such individuals — individuals who exploit citizen 
obedience at the detriment of their own wellbeing — be recognized as true “political” 
leaders? We cannot endorse Hobbes’ political views without endorsing such examples, 
and without permitting ourselves to be complicit with such horrendous acts of violence 
and oppression. Therefore, we must acknowledge that Hobbes’ and Weber’s societal 
standards are too low, and ultimately make the proactive decision to reject their claim as 
to the true basis of politics.  
 Clearly, neither Hobbes nor Weber have reached the heart of what it means to 
practice true politics. However, such focus on the power of the sovereign and obedience 
is not a mistake merely made by these two individuals — it is a mistake that has been 
made by many other political philosophers and theorists throughout world history. North 
African thinker Ibn Khaldun, of the fourteenth century, expressed a strong belief in the 
Arab practice of “royal authority,” in which “superiority and the power to rule by 
force” (284). Within such authority, one individual attains total power over his peers, and 
can execute such power using effective methods of coercion, thereby effectively 
controlling the violence and injustice inherent in human nature. Similarly, Italian 
renaissance philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli believed that the political leader’s only 
legitimate concern should be how to acquire and maintain power and authority over 
others, regardless of what unethical methods are used to accomplish such (Nederman). 
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An excellent example of this is Machiavelli’s infamous idea in his work, The Prince, 
which states that it is much better for a political ruler to be feared than loved by one’s 
subjects, as the dread of punishment never fails to keep individuals in line. Finally, 
twentieth century French theorist, Michel Foucault, advocated for the state’s utilization of 
discipline —specifically, hierarchical observation — as a tool to mold its citizens into 
obedient units that can further its purpose as a political body. In Discipline And Punish, 
Foucault asserts that the gaze of peoples in superior positions can be used to keep those 
of inferior positions in line due to its ability instill a sense of fear and accountability of 
those in inferior positions that keeps such individuals in order. Thus, we can conclude 
that Hobbes’s and Weber’s flawed approaches to politics only contribute to a problem 
that stretches across a great deal of human thought. As such, it is important to recognize 
this pervasiveness because it provides urgency to the problem of understanding politics in 
an alternative, more productive way for humanity. 
Equality As Political Alternative To Obedience 
 Recognizing the flaws in defining politics as obedience to a sovereign power, we 
remain faced with the challenging question of how to define politics. How should we 
understand the concept of politics? How do we define it, and what does it look like? The 
solution to this dilemma can be found through an analysis of Hannah Arendt’s theories on 
politics and humanity. As exposed by Arendt, politics is far from an organized structure 
formatted with the simple purpose of external obedience, domination and the assertion of 
power. Instead, politics is quite the contrary, deriving its roots from equality between 
multiple persons. Arendt claims that politics is an open dialogue of discussion between 
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equals, which seeks to guarantee the equality for others as well. Ultimately, Arendt’s 
beliefs regarding politics prove to be of a much more productive view in comparison to 
Hobbes and Weber, working to avoid tyrannical and violent positions of power, and 
striving towards justice and equity for all. 
 The virtue of equality is one of Arendt’s most consistent narratives throughout the 
entirety of her works. Such consistency helps us to solidify and confirm her perception 
that equality is among the most important virtues of human life, and with it, politics. In 
1929, at the very beginning of Arendt’s scholarly career, Arendt wrote her dissertation, 
Love And Saint Augustine, in which she explores the life and works of Saint Augustine, 
an early Christian theologian and philosopher. In this piece, Arendt lays the groundwork 
for her interest in equality as a crucial and necessary point in the practice of politics. 
Other academics, such as Sarah Elizabeth Spengeman, agree that it was this first study of 
Arendt’s which had a remarkably lasting and influential effect on the remainder of 
Arendt’s career. However, while Spengemen focuses on the concept of human plurality 
(which I will return to later), I hold that the most important building block in this essay 
for Arendt’s future work is the concept of equality and love for one’s neighbor. 
 In Love And Saint Augustine, Arendt explores Augustine’s ideas on the human 
responsibility for equality by interpreting the derivative of the Christian commandment to 
practice “neighborly love.” Ultimately, as Arendt learns from Augustine, the importance 
of loving all individuals stems from mankind’s original state. Perhaps one could even 
refer to this a biblical “state of nature,” though in a vastly different and more optimistic 
sense than that of Hobbes. As Arendt learns from the Christian theologian, “the reason 
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one should love one’s neighbor is that the neighbor is fundamentally one’s equal and both 
share the same sinful past” (106). To elaborate, mankind’s equality originates in the 
common ancestry of Adam and Eve. If one has any biblical knowledge whatsoever, it is 
most likely regarding this story. We can probably all recall the decision of the first man 
and the first woman to disregard God’s rules to not eat the infamous apple. Similarly, 
readers are most likely already aware of the fact that this decision is mankind’s original 
sin, which ultimately leads to the forceful expulsion from the Garden of Eden. Thus, 
through Augustine, Arendt is exposed to the idea that everyone is deserving of love and 
equal treatment because we are all equally flawed individuals who derive from the same 
origins. 
 Although this reasoning may be accepted as sound for those of Judeo-Christian 
backgrounds, there are of course, other individuals who may be less inclined to accept 
such a religious explanation for the basis of equality. However, across all religious (and 
especially secular), spectrums, the overall message remains relatively unchanged; if we 
are all human, we all come from the same, we all are the same, and thus, are all deserving 
of the same. In a similar vain, Arendt’s dissertation is not necessarily announcing her 
allegiance to Christian beliefs nor her acceptance of biblical narratives — in fact, she is 
of Jewish descent. Yet, this piece on Augustine does allude to her primary interest in 
exploring the importance of equality beginning with her introduction into theoretical 
literature. As such, the most important aspect we should take away from Love And Saint 
Augustine is the fact that Arendt is fascinated by the nature of human to human 
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interactions, and the basis of that nature. Thus, we arrive at a central focus of Arendtian 
politics: a discussion between equals. 
	 Now that we have established a basis for Arendt’s stress on equality, and where 
the validity of such a stress derives, let us examine such a concept within Arendt’s direct 
discussions on politics. In Arendt’s acclaimed book, The Promise of Politics, Arendt 
proposes that true politics is possible only when total equality among the polis is 
achieved. Arendt’s views largely stem from her overwhelming solidarity with ancient 
Greek theology and politics. Arendt claims: 

“The meaning of politics...is that men in their freedom can interact with one another 
without compulsion, force, and rule over one another, as equals among 
equals...managing all their affairs by speaking with and persuading one another” (117). 
Arendt’s ideas encourage us to begin to understand politics in a new way — as the 
interaction between men, rather than the domination and oppression of men. Though the 
Grecian context may have intended for only landowning, non-slave white men to partake 
in this vision of politics, the basis of their theologies can be applied to a much more 
equitable society today. As understood by the Greeks (and, likewise, Arendt), true politics 
means that men have the freedom to interact and debate with one another on an equal 
platform. Arendt’s use of the word “freedom” is significant here, as such is another key 
theme for her understanding of politics. For Arendt, freedom is the ability to produce 
original action (for example, engaging in discussion) which ultimately permits politics to 
occur. Additionally, the use of the words “force” and “rule” signify Arendt’s exact 
opposition to the political definitions given my Hobbes and Weber. This is because, only 
through the space between two equal individuals, can true dialogue flow through the 
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means of conversation. If those engaging in such dialogues are not interacting as equals 
— in other words, if a power dynamic is established, such as that of the dominant 
sovereign and the subordinate citizen — the notion of true politics fails to occur. As such, 
Arendt’s notion of politics avoids the problematic political landscape of obedience, 
instead focusing on something far greater and more just for humanity. 
 In this way, Arendt sets a high standard for politics— a standard which does not 
come to fruition very often. Within a truly political space, no man is alpha, but instead 
valued equally to his peers. Such communal organization allows ideas to move fluidly 
and productively, and be discussed at great length. Thus, equality is a key value in the 
formulation of politics. As exemplified throughout history, however, true politics rarely 
occurs. Any snapshot of history will give you the same result: an exorbitant amount of 
tyrannical governments and dictatorships, and the brutal violence that accompanies them. 
Such so called “political” structures are actually the very antithesis of politics, as 
illustrated by Arendt. In tyranny, equality does not exist; there is only the dictatorial 
regime and its followers — despite what we might gather from Hobbes or Weber. 
Without equal representation and space for all individuals in political discussion, 
however, we fail to fulfill true political aims. 
 Due to Arendt’s perfectionist attitude pertaining to politics — that without 
equality, politics is not even in practice —  some individuals might become frustrated by 
the fact that such a conception of politics is nearly impossible to achieve. Though I can 
relate to this frustration, I maintain the importance of defining concrete goals for an 
improved society. Such groundwork is a necessary, crucial step to eventually reaching 
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and achieving such goals. Regardless of the fact that the goal seemingly has yet to be 
attained, and though it might be incredibly difficult to do so, the creation of such an 
explicit objective helps guide human history to the most productive and just political 
destinations. For the aim of a political space grounded in equality is to ensure that the 
political system embraces open dialogue, discussion, and debate in such a way that ideas 
can be analyzed and explored in an objective setting. Only through such politics are 
individuals able to speak their minds, have the opportunity to disagree with one another 
or express concerns, and engage with one another in a way that allows for constructive 
political decisions to be made that are beneficial to all — i.e. that treat citizens fairly, 
with equality in respect and love for the entire body politic. The intention of a political 
practice (where we accept equality as its foundation) is to dialogue in such a way so as to 
arrive at the best possible laws and decisions for all individuals. 
 It is important to note here that, although I stress Arendt’s definition of politics as 
equality as superior to Hobbes’ definition as obedience, Hobbes does recognize the 
importance of equality, and seems to value it as an important piece of society. Hobbes 
believes that politics (and the act of obedience towards the sovereign) can, in essence, 
preserve the natural notion of equality through its preservation of individual liberties. To 
state a drastic example: if everyone obeys the law of the sovereign to abstain from 
murder, then everyone’s right to life is equally preserved. The same argument could be 
made for abstaining from thievery and protecting everyone’s properties. However, despite 
this fact, Hobbes’ problem is that he ultimately he fails to define politics as equality itself. 
Although laws are made to equally protect the rights of the body politic, Hobbes’ stress 
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remains that good politics requires obedience, and likewise, that political action itself is 
attained only through obedience. As such, equality is not included in Hobbes’ central 
discussion of politics itself, but more-so as an after thought and a bi-product of politics. 
Hobbesian politics maintains that everyone should be kept in line by means of an 
ultimate, sovereign power. Once such domination is imposed, a form of dominated 
equality (or, vertical equality) exists among the people. Arendtian politics, on the other 
hand, asserts the importance of participation equality (or, horizontal equality), in addition 
to employing such methods for the equality for all. 
 In sharp contrast to Hobbes, Arendt clearly does define politics as an interaction 
of equality, yet she also shows that it can be used to ensure equality in the treatment of 
others. As demonstrated by St. Augustine (and illuminated in Arendt’s dissertation), 
humans are deserving of equal treatment due to our original position in the world and our 
status as flawed individuals — although this is not necessarily how nature always plays 
out. Equality is not a natural notion that men are born with. In her work, On Revolution, 
Arendt states that “isonomy” or, the equality of political rights, guarantees equality “not 
because all men [are] born or created equal, but, on the contrary, because men [are] by 
nature not equal, and [need] an artificial institution, the polis, which by virtue…[will] 
make them equal” (21). In this quote, Arendt exposes man’s attempt to use politics as a 
method to attain equality despite his original position of inequality in the world. There is 
something unique about mankind that causes us to contemplate and reflect, and to think 
about whether our natural behaviors are wrong. Thus, Arendt demonstrates that 
individuals practice politics by engaging in interactions of equality, and that such 
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interactions should be used to create structures that work to secure and maintain the 
equality of others. 
Achieving Politics Through The Personal 
 With the truth of Arendt’s words expose, the question now becomes — how can 
such a notion of equality as politics be achieved? Although I profoundly disagree with 
Weber’s assumed truths regarding the foundation of politics and the state, the remainder 
of his speech, Politics As A Vocation, does begin to point us in the right direction. 
Through his exploration of how men can achieve a successful career in politics, he 
questions why individuals choose to obey leadership in the first place. Weber then delves 
into the personal characteristics of men and how such characteristics might impact 
politics. The analysis of Weber’s discussion exposes the large influence of the personal 
when it comes to politics, which will eventually bring us back to Arendt. 
	 Weber states that there are three unique justifications for a community’s 
willingness and ability to be dominated and follow some other authority. The first is the 
authority of what is “traditional” and perceived as the “eternal yesterday” (78). In other 
words, the societal recognition of tradition, habit, and perhaps melancholia for the past. 
The second is the authority of what is “legal,” or the acceptance of logical and valid 
societal rules (78). The third, and for the purpose of Weber’s article, most important 
authority is that of one’s charisma. This “personal gift of grace” evokes the community’s 
total devotion and trust in the specific and internal qualities of “individual 
leadership” (78). Even in a democracy, Weber asserts that citizens vote on a primarily 
emotional basis, depending on how they feel towards a particular politician. Thus, the 
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successful politician acquires a following of devoted persons primarily due to their 
internal characteristics. Others follow because there is something about these 
characteristics that causes them to believe in the leader. Without this sense of personal 
charm, the ability to assert authority and gather a significant number of followers remains 
elusive. Therefore, these is clearly something about one’s personal characteristics which 
impacts their success in participating in what Weber defines as “politics.” 
 Next, Weber identifies what personal qualities make someone a good politician — 
in addition to the internal charismatic nature that makes others prone to follow. According 
to Weber, there are three primary characteristics that make for a ‘strong’ and likewise, 
successful political personality: passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of 
proportion (97). By “passion,” Weber is referring to one’s devotion to a particular cause. 
One must attain motivation to addressing and solving specific issues. By “responsibility,” 
Weber means being responsible with the use of one’s power. A politician must be 
responsible for the outcomes of his actions, and must not take this responsibility lightly. 
On the flip side, one’s irresponsibility might come to form when a politician enjoys 
“power merely for power’s sake” without a legitimate or worthy purpose (98). However, 
I would maintain that regardless of one’s intentions, defining politics and  a politician’s 
purpose as attaining power and sovereignty over others is a dangerous position to assert, 
and a slippery slope to totalitarianism.  
 Nevertheless, we finally come to the matter of “proportion.” Weber introduces 
this concept as the most important psychological quality of the politician, stating that one 
needs such a characteristic in order to exhibit responsibility as well. By “sense of 
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proportion,” Weber means the ability to always work and address issues with inner calm 
and peace, and to not let external realities impact this inner calm. Weber suggests the 
ability to achieve proportion can be attained by maintaining an objective perspective 
towards political matters, and avoiding one’s (in a sense, inherent) subjective lens. In this 
way, it seems that the so called ‘good’ politician must be able to strike some type of 
balance between passion towards a cause and utilizing objectivity in one’s political 
manner as well. One should not get too internally involved with any particular issue or 
cause, instead employing awareness for one’s personal biases. As Weber describes, the 
politician must at all times maintain some type of “distance [between] things and men,” 
and similarly, “distance towards one’s self” (98). To lack such distance is of grave 
concern for the politician, because one might get too riled up and internally invested in a 
particular issue, and therefore cease to rule in a so-called ‘responsible’ manner. 
 Though Weber’s argument attains validity, and though he is on the path to the 
right answer, he fails to go truly deep enough into what makes humans behave this way. 
How do we explain passion? What do we attribute to an individuals’ ability to express 
objectivity? I interpret these as rather vague explanations and understandings into what 
makes a politician ‘great’ or even ‘good.’ Despite these critiques and concerns, and even 
though Weber is explaining how such forces can be employed by an individual in order to 
achieve total domination, he does expose the fact that the personal plays a large role in 
the actualization and realization of politics. This leads us to Arendt, who successfully 
executes a deep theoretical analysis into what aspects of the individual greatly influence 
politics. Through a confrontation of Arendt’s theories, we arrive at the conclusion that the 
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answer to what influences good politics can only be found through the understanding of 
humanity, and what it means to be human. To put it in Arendt’s words, the “human 
condition.”  Before embarking on the journey of discovering how good politics is to be 
achieved, and thus a sense of political and societal equality, we must  first embark on a 
journey of ourselves. Before understanding how the human experience impacts politics, 
we must first ask: what does it mean to be human? 
Defining The Human Experience: Plurality 
	 An extensive examination of Arendt’s collective works makes it clear that she is 
mesmerized by what it means to be human. Not only is she fascinated by the realities of 
the human experience — she believes in the superiority of humans among other living 
things. In Arendt’s work, The Human Condition, she claims that human beings are among 
“the most highly developed species of organic life,” directly highlighting the humanistic 
lens with which she views the world and political concepts (11). In the same way that 
scientists split the atom, Arendt’s literature strives to break apart the human experience 
and examine what it truly means to be human, especially in how it pertains to politics. In 
her exploration, Arendt identifies a key aspect of the human condition which provides 
mankind with the ability to elicit true political action: plurality. Through an analysis of 
‘plurality,’ Arendt seeks to understand the human experience and with it, the very 
foundation of politics itself. 
 Arendt describes human ‘plurality’ or ‘duality’ (I will use the two terms 
interchangeably) as a key trait which is integral to the human condition and therefore 
politics. As she explains in The Promise of Politics, ‘duality’ is the uniquely human 
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ability to engage in a dialogue with one’s self (20). One can form original thoughts and 
opinions, yet also ponder those thoughts and opinions without ever conversing with 
another person. This contemplation, Arendt argues, is crucial for forming one’s 
conscience and thus for pursuing morality and justice as well. She states, “no man can 
keep his conscience intact who cannot actualize the dialogue with himself” (25). 
Reflection on one’s own thoughts and actions, as well as others’ thoughts and actions, is 
necessary in order to determine how one ought to engage with the world. For example, if 
I am unable to thoughtfully contemplate my actions prior to my execution of them, I am 
unable to consider important consequences, such as how my actions might impact 
another individual. If I have harmed another individual, how can I express remorse for 
my mistake or compassion for this person without an ability to adequately reflect, or 
consider how my actions have in fact impacted this other person. If I am unable to engage 
in these conversations with myself, how can I possibly responsibly determine what 
actions to take? Thus, it becomes clear that human plurality teaches us how to live with 
ourselves, as well as how to live and interact with others in a community — important 
knowledge to have in order to practice Arendt’s proposed definition of good politics. As 
Arendt states, “living together with others begins with living together with oneself” (21). 
If we cannot engage in these reflective conversations, demonstrating awareness of 
ourselves and our actions, the ability to live peacefully and productively with other 
members of society becomes impossible. Therefore, only through the experience of 
human duality can the central goal of politics itself realized. 
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	 It is fascinating that Arendt explicitly promotes a personal characteristic for 
politics that Weber explicitly denounces. While Arendt stresses the importance of 
connecting with the self through pluralistic conversations in order to act responsibly (in 
both a political and nonpolitical manner), Weber blatantly argues that the ‘good’ political 
leader can only act responsibly by means of keeping a respective distance from his or 
herself. If we return to my earlier analysis of Weber’s speech, we see his clear 
proclamation that the politician must exhibit such distance in order to maintain a sense of 
‘proportion’ towards matters of the state. Weber seems to assert that if one is too in touch 
with one’s personal political agenda, one’s judgment may become clouded, and he or she 
may not be able to make good decisions on behalf of the state he or she is representing. In 
sharp contrast, Arendt asserts that only through the conversation with one’s self, or the 
interaction with one’s duality, can one truly explore whether or not a particular decision 
may benefit others, and thus serve the greater purpose of politics (equality). It is 
important to note that although Arendt and Weber do explore the influence of the 
personal in politics, they advocate for exact opposite personality traits within the 
individual who engages with politics. This distinction sheds light on the fact that while 
the notion of Arendt’s politics requires human plurality, obedience-focused governments, 
such as those that Weber promotes as an inherent part of state politics, are inherently 
intertwined with lack of plurality. 
 In keeping with this line of thinking, Arendt claims that totalitarian regimes often 
do manipulate mass communities’ lack of plurality in order to achieve and maintain their 
dominating power. In order to understand this point, we must first understand Arendt’s 
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explanations of three different — though seemingly similar — concepts which all lie on 
the spectrum of being alone. Throughout the entirety of Arendt’s works, she continues to 
relate political action (and problematic inaction) to solitude, isolation, and loneliness. To 
begin, Arendt demonstrates that plurality is always realized within solitude, and vice 
versa. Only through solitude, through the ability of being alone with one’s self and one’s 
thoughts, can one engage in the internal dialogue of duality. At times, Arendt goes so far 
as to suggest that the two are interchangeable, defining solitude as the “dialogue of the 
two-in-one” (36, The Promise of Politics). Thus, through plurality, one always remains 
connected to the self. Therefore, the experience of solitude is never one of being truly 
alone or lonely, for even when separated from other individuals, one remains in contact 
with the self (20). A central problem for politics, then, arises when this sense of solitude, 
and thus plurality, is destroyed. As Arendt demonstrates, when this key aspect of human 
condition is destroyed, politics quickly follows. Arendt furthers the discussion in her 
statement that the primary concern of totalitarian governments is to “eliminate all 
possibility of solitude” for its participants (24). Thus, it seems that totalitarianism 
movements are facilitated by individuals who cannot participate in a healthy relationship 
with themselves, and have therefore lost a sense of their own humanity. As such, these 
individuals lose the ability to think and reflect, and are merely left with their ability to 
act, or, follow orders of those in power.   
 Instead of solitude, totalitarian governments require both isolation and loneliness 
of the masses in order to be effective. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt states that 
the totalitarian movement is always formed by “mass organizations of atomized, isolated 
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individuals” (323) who are lacking in “normal social relationships,” i.e. who exhibit 
loneliness (317). Isolation and loneliness, however, both lie on different points of the 
spectrum of being alone. Arendt identifies ‘isolation’ as the political inability to produce 
meaningful action, due to a lack of other individuals who are either not willing or able to 
join in the cause, whatever it may be (474). Isolation is a key factor in tyranny because it 
damages an individual’s sense of agency by destroying communal support. In this way, 
isolation removes the possibility to induce change or revolt, and provides a platform for 
the tyrant to easily assert control. ‘Loneliness,’ on the other hand, extends past politics 
into a more personal sphere of the individual self. It is characterized by Arendt as a 
feeling of desertion from all human companionship (474). This can refer to the 
experience between individuals, but it can also reference the relationship to one’s self; in 
other words, one’s plurality. This is where loneliness becomes most problematic to 
humanity, for in this experience, man loses his own sense of self. Thus, to feel truly 
lonely means to not be fully human. Without the ability to think independently, man’s 
total manipulation becomes an even simpler task, creating blind followers of the tyrant’s 
regime. In this sense, totalitarianism disrupts both the public sphere (through influencing 
political action) and the private sphere (through damaging personal identity and 
wellbeing). 
 This dangerous combination of isolation and loneliness is crucial for 
understanding totalitarianism, yet also worth noting is Arendt’s mention of the the 
“masses.” Interestingly, tyranny’s success is also only possible through mass groups of 
people. Arendt says, 
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 “Totalitarian movements are possible wherever there are masses who for one reason or 
another have acquired the appetite for political organization. Masses are not held 
together by a consciousness of common interest and they lack that specific class 
articulateness which is expressed in determined, limited, and obtainable goals” (311).  
Arendt paints a picture of the “masses” as a gigantic, disorganized body of individuals 
who, though they have internalized particular political motivations, are ultimately 
incapable of acting on them due to their isolated and lonely statuses. Therefore, it makes 
sense that such masses follow tyrannical leaders so loyally — they are attracted to the 
promises that such strong political figures make in terms of action and follow through. 
Though mass society consists of numerous individuals lacking in personal agency, when 
brought together under a dictatorial leader, these masses are able to exert enormous 
amounts of power. It is strange and even ironic that the totalitarian movement requires a 
large body of individuals — a community, in a sense — who are united only through their 
individual experiences of isolation and loneliness. Yet, as Arendt demonstrates, it is 
possible to experience these concepts when surrounded by people, just as through 
solitude, it is possible to be comforted by one’s own company even while completely 
alone. Again, Arendt’s explanation of totalitarianism highlights the significant danger that 
lack of human plurality can pose. This is important to note because through this 
understanding of totalitarianism as functioning with lack of plurality we see not only that 
plurality is needed for good politics but the incredible dangers of what can happen when 
plurality is not present. interestingly, obedience based regimes and lack of plurality are 
two sides of the same coin. 
Plurality (Or Lack Thereof) In The Holocaust  
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 Just as plurality is the key to the political utopia of equality, its absence is also the 
key to political and societal destruction, further highlighting its important role in the 
politician’s psyche. In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt provides further insight into what 
might happen when this very sense of plurality is lost from the human condition. In this 
work, Arendt analyzes the rise and fall of Adolf Eichmann, a German Nazi official 
executed for actively participating in war crimes of the Holocaust, such as the mass 
deportation of Jews from Germany. Arendt’s illumination of Eichmann’s internal flaw 
demonstrates its great potential to cause disaster and total destruction for politics as well 
as the entire human race. Arendt identifies Eichmann’s total disregard for others, his 
seeming lack of conscience, and ultimately, his failure to experience the human condition 
of plurality, as precisely the root causes of his politically destructive and toxic actions. 
 Much of Arendt’s work follows the progression of Eichmann’s trial on his 
contributions to the Holocaust. She recalls a particular moment of an interrogation, in 
which Eichmann defends his horrific actions with the reasoning (read: excuse) that he 
was simply doing what he was told. 
“[Eichmann] remembered perfectly well that he would have had a bad conscience only if 
he had not done what he had been ordered to do — to ship millions of men, women, and 
children to their death with great zeal and the most meticulous care” (25).  
In this passage, Eichmann claims that he does not feel guilty for committing war crimes 
because he was simply following the orders of his superiors (mainly Hitler). However, 
what Eichmann means to say is that he is incapable of expressing feelings of guilt 
because he has no conscience at all — or a faulty one at best. Eichmann clearly has no 
ability to ponder the consequences of his actions nor his role as a facilitator in the 
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Holocaust. Instead of engaging in a thoughtful dialogue with himself —  such as “how 
will this action impact the Jewish citizenry?” — Eichmann functions as a robotic cog in 
an incredibly problematic system of oppression and violence. He is incapable of taking 
responsibility for his actions, perhaps because he is unable to realize that he has agency 
and power within himself to break from his commands and not participate in the horrors 
of the Holocaust. This is not to say that it would have been as simple as standing up to his 
Nazi counterparts and politely saying “no.” However, Eichmann clearly does not even 
have the internal capacity to reflect upon or even acknowledge the fact that he is a guilty 
party. In this way, Eichmann is exposed as a simple-minded man who can only blindly 
follow his superiors, and never triumphantly take the lead in the pursuit of justice, or at 
least some form of better politics. 
 Arendt delves further into Eichmann’s character than simply the trial, however, 
providing further evidence as to Eichmann’s lack of plurality and therefore conscience. A 
frequent point of reference for Arendt is Eichmann’s inability to speak. On a basic level, 
Eichmann does not know how to communicate with others. He is self obsessed, 
constantly brags, speaks in absurd cliches. Many times, in fact, he expresses total and 
complete disregard for the fact that others even exist, as demonstrated by his inability to 
keep track of Jewish history (which he played such an active role in) though he can recall 
major turning points in his career (53). In fact, he claims his “greatest grief and sorrow” 
to be his failure to advance farther in his position within the S.S. (33). How is it that a 
man who’s actions so violently impacted an entire people can remain so absurdly, at 
times almost blissfully, ignorant to the consequences of his actions? How can he evade 
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any sense of responsibility within himself, and only focus on his personal wellbeing? The 
answer lies within Eichmann’s lack of plurality. Arendt elaborates: 
“The longer one listened to him, the more obvious it became that his inability to speak 
was closely connected with an inability to think, namely, to think from the standpoint of 
somebody else. No communication was possible with him” (49, emphasis mine). 
This is precisely what Arendt defines as Eichmann’s fatal flaw. Of course, the inability to 
speak is a major problem when trying to exercise what myself or Arendt might refer to as 
“good” politics (as only through speech and action can we implement change in the 
search for justice). Yet it is the demonstrated inability to exercise his mind, and thus 
engage in a conversation with himself, that is Eichmann’s true undoing. In this way, 
Eichmann is illustrated as a man who remains unable to imagine how his actions or 
words may impact others. He is a man without any internal conscience whatsoever, 
thereby failing to contemplate his actions or express any care and empathy for anyone 
besides himself. 
	 Arendt’s horrifying descriptions of Eichmann illuminate the great danger 
presented before the world when mankind loses his ability to think for himself. When 
man is unable to engage with his own psyche, we find that he is unable to engage with 
others’ as well. Through this failure, man looses his empathy, compassion, and sense of 
responsibility to other human beings — in essence, his conscience, and his humanity. 
Further, through Eichmann we are given an excellent demonstration of the fact that 
obedience cannot possibly be defined as the ultimate gate keeper of good politics. 
Through the end, Eichmann routinely referred back to the fact that he maintained his 
position as a “law-abiding citizen” throughout the atrocities of the Holocaust (24, 
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Eichmann in Jerusalem). Not only do we realize through this analysis that law-
conforming obedience can be incredibly problematic (which will further be exposed in 
my analysis of totalitarianism) — we uncover the truth that the failure to realize one’s 
true humanity through plurality may lead to utter destruction and devastation for the body 
politic and millions of innocent civilians. 
 This is, of course, what was meant by Arendt’s infamous though controversial 
phrase, “the banality of evil” (as mentioned in Eichmann in Jerusalem). As she explains, 
the world’s most horrific atrocities are rarely executed by truly evil individuals. Instead, 
such events are often brought about by seemingly very average, normal people, who are 
merely incapable of realizing their own humanity through plurality. As Arendt explicitly 
states, Eichmann was never found to be clinically insane. Rather, he was a simpleton with 
an inability to think. He followed the orders of his superiors to a fault — not because of 
personal antisemitic beliefs, but because he always adhered to the law and did not think 
twice about whether or not it was just. His main concern was his own personal wellbeing 
as a citizen, his own advancement as a member of the S.S., and personal glory and gains 
through such advancement. He was unaware of himself in the context of history and 
unaware of the consequences of his actions in how they pertained to others. Through the 
end, he appeared completely unaware of his own responsibility in the perpetuation of a 
system of oppression and abhorrent violence. As Arendt states in The Life of The Mind, 
“the sad truth is that most evil is done by people who never make up their minds to be 
good or evil.” Likewise, Eichmann never made a conscientious decision to commit evil. 
He had no conscience at all, and never thought twice about his actions. His story 
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demonstrates that when political actors lack their own human plurality, the result has the 
potential to be truly catastrophic for the entire state.  
A Dangerous Void in Today’s Politics: Trump’s Lack of Plurality 
 Though Eichmann is a perfect example of the dangers facing society when a 
political figure lacks plurality, there are examples much more applicable to the modern 
world of politics that we find ourselves in today. One such example is the current 
President of the United States: Donald Trump. It is no secret that citizens and policy 
makers across the political spectrum are perplexed, shocked, and in many ways terrified 
by the manner in which Trump conducts himself within his position of POTUS. A recent 
Gallup pole, conducted in October of this year, pegged his approval rating at a measly 
35% (Marcin). Clearly, most American citizens are frustrated and disturbed by Trump’s 
behavior as commander-in-chief. So, how can we explain Trump’s political (and 
nonpolitical) behaviors? What is it, exactly, that makes him such a poor politician for the 
country? Ultimately, Trump’s etiquette as an adult individual demonstrates a gaping hole 
in the aforementioned crucial characteristic of the ‘good’ politician: plurality. 
 Trump’s inability to realize his plurality can be traced back to his blatant failure to 
form relationships with others. In Politico Magazine’s September 2017 issue, reporter 
Michael Kruse delves into the many ways in which Trump appears to be perhaps the most 
“lonely” president the country has ever seen. Kruse’s article, “The Loneliest President,” 
provides example after example of Trump’s consistent inability to form any sort of social 
bond or relationship with other individuals. Of course, by employing the term “lonely,” 
Kruse was not necessarily intentionally paying tribute to Trump’s lack of solitude as 
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explained by Arendt. However, Trump’s demonstrated difficulty in maintaining or even 
forming relationships with others does speak directly to Arendt’s concerns regarding the 
inability to realize one’s plurality. As Arendt states, “only someone who has had the 
experience of talking with himself is capable of being a friend, of acquiring another 
self” (20, The Promise of Politics). If you cannot communicate with yourself, you cannot 
communicate with others. It follows, then, that one who is incapable of forming 
friendships is likely handicapped by his or her own failure of truly understanding and 
engaging in dialogue with themselves. Equipped with this knowledge, we can better 
understand why Trump is incapable of deep social connections — he simply does not 
possess an ability to connect with himself, and thus cannot do so with other individuals 
either. This analysis works to demonstrate why Trump is incapable of ever being the type 
of politician who can achieve good [Arendtian] politics, yet it also leaves us with the 
horrifying implications and consequences of such failure. 
 Trump has always been lonely. To return to Arendt’s understanding of 
‘loneliness,’ such an experience is the feeling of total desertion of all human 
companionship, including one’s self. We can find many examples of Trump’s failure to 
form friendships and meaningful social bonds today. Through repeatedly attacking, 
bullying, and attempting to humiliate others, often in the name of bigotry, Trump has 
ostracized himself from countless individuals (ranging from political opponents to brief 
acquaintances). In Kruse’s article, he names person after person within Trump’s inner 
circle who has in some way echoed this fact, providing further validity to this identity. 
The author of Trump’s biography, Tim O’Brien, referred to his subject in an interview as 
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“one of the loneliest people” he had ever met, adding that throughout Trump’s entire life, 
he had failed to form deep bonds or relationships with others. Trump’s former casino 
executive, Jack O’Donnell, repeated this sentiment, stating “he was and is a lonely man.” 
Another business associate once told Newsweek that, “friendship is not a part of his 
agenda.” One of the few individuals who has remained in contact with Trump over the 
years, Roger Stone, once claimed that Trump has been both psychologically and 
emotionally “lonely and isolated” since long before he assumed the presidency. Even 
Trump himself, in an interview with the Washington Post, at one point self-identified as 
the “Lone Ranger.” The sheer number of these statements is shocking to say the least, and 
addresses the undeniable truth that Trump does not connect with others, and thus must 
lack the ability (and perhaps even the will) to do so. 
 This failure to demonstrate some type of ability and willingness to connect with 
others is further exposed when examining the life of Trump from adolescence to 
adulthood. From the very beginning of Trump’s young adult life — a crucial 
developmental stage in which individuals begin to form the crux of their personal identity 
— he proved himself unable of forming true relationships. Kruse goes as far back into the 
past as Trump’s college experiences, acquiring input from past peers into Trump’s 
outsider status. Students confirmed that Trump neither made nor kept any friends while 
he was in college at Fordham University, nor later when he transferred to the University 
of Pennsylvania or began to attend the New York Military academy. One childhood 
acquaintance pointed to Trump’s uncomfortable competitiveness as a point of difficulty 
for being friends with him. Another, Sandy McIntosh, recalled memories in which Trump 
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refused to laugh at his jokes, or anyone else’s. Says McIntosh, “you think of humor as a 
basic, empathic way that friendships are formed — and he just didn’t” (Kruse). Not only 
does this quote specifically signify Trump’s lack of empathy (a crucial piece of plurality) 
as demonstrated by his social interactions, it provides a vibrant example of Trump’s 
failure to meaningfully engage and connect with others. Again, we see how Trump seems 
to lack the implicit self awareness necessary to participate in friendship, further 
illustrating his inability to connect with himself. 
 Acknowledging Trump’s failure to realize his plurality, we are able to better 
understand and explain other problematic aspects of his personality. Perhaps the most 
disturbing of these aspects is the inability to compromise. Kruse points to the fact that 
once he became a businessman, Trump time and again professed his distaste for partners 
and shareholders, pointing to Trump’s disdain for engaging in collaboration, compromise, 
or any type of dialogue that requires respecting others as his equal. Even the mere act of a 
handshake, a point of physical touch that signals respect, acknowledgment, and 
appreciation of another individual, has been accused by the President as being a “curse” 
of American society (Kruse). Additionally, instead of engaging in collaborative 
discussions with those of equal authority who may hold different beliefs, Trump 
continuously chooses to appoint family members (obligatory relationships; non 
friendships) and strong loyalists, and diligently works to remove individuals from 
positions when they are in disagreement with or threaten his agendas and policies. As 
such, Trump’s governmental regime continues to move eerily close to totalitarianism, 
further proving the fact that even indirectly, lack of plurality and totalitarianism are two 
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sides of the same coin. Again, these examples work to further expose the fact that one, 
due to an inability to engage in internal dialogue, Trump cannot see from someone else’s 
point of view, nor accept and respect other individuals as his equal, and two, as such, he 
is entirely incapable of participating in the type of politics which Arendt (and myself) 
praise. 
 Lack of plurality also explains Trump’s constant state of paranoia and 
competitiveness. In a tone reminiscent of Hobbes’ view of human life as “nasty” and 
“brutish,” Trump views the world —  and with it, humanity — through an incredibly 
pessimistic and competitive lens. Through this perspective, no-one can be trusted, and, it 
can be assumed that, quite frankly, everyone is ‘out to get’ you, your possessions, or both. 
In Trump’s 2007 book, Think Big, he expresses anxiety over other individuals wanting 
what you already have, claiming that “[people] act nice to your face, but underneath 
they’re out to kill you” (Kruse). Kruse highlights another one of Trump’s previous quotes 
in which he explicitly states “I’m a non-trusting person.” Trust is an important aspect of 
any relationship, especially friendship. Yet, Trump seems to reject any notion of 
depending on somebody else, for fear of exploitation, manipulation, backstabbing, or the 
like. Without an ability to understand himself or other individuals, it makes perfect sense 
that Trump behaves in such an aggressive manor. If he is incapable of pondering the 
perspective of another human being, it may seem perfectly reasonable and rational to 
assume such a competitive mindset. Regardless of reason, however, such a mindset 
remains incredibly problematic for political action. Obsession with eternal competition 
perpetuates a mindset of preserving one’s own wellbeing at the expense of others, and 
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thus explains his apparent lack of compassion and empathy towards others. Trump does 
not accept responsibility for the wellbeing of others because he assumes they will turn 
around and take advantage of him. The acknowledgment of this fact provides a possible 
explanation for Trump’s offensive mannerisms and personal etiquette (such as his 
offensive language towards women), as well as his blatantly oppressive racist, 
xenophobic and classist policies. Ultimately, such an analysis demonstrates that the 
failure of political officials to realize their plurality proves to be incredibly dangerous and 
destructive for all politically motivated action. 
Where Do We Go From Here? 
 In conclusion, plurality is a key component of ‘good’ political practice. 
Acknowledging that true politics can only occur amid a dialogue between equals, 
political participants must possess certain personal characteristics that can only be 
attained through one’s sense of plurality. Without such abilities, it becomes much more 
likely for the politician to act in irresponsible and incredibly destructive manners for the 
state. Further, not only does this void of plurality pose a serious threat to the future of 
human society — it eliminates the possibility of true political action ever occurring.  
 Interestingly, however, the influence of one’s relationship with the self in matters 
of politics — or any other field for that matter — remains to be given serious validity and 
attribution for the course of human history. Although academic explorations may address 
the concept of the personal within politics, the matter of the personal is something which 
society, for better or worse, continues to suppress in hopes to claim superiority over the 
delicate nature of what it means to be human. Instead of working to curate a healthy 
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relationship with ourselves in order to achieve prosperity as a society, the human race — 
particularly in the US — continues to downplay the significance of internal wellbeing. An 
excellent example of this is the current state of secrecy and stigma regarding mental 
health. This is not to say that those who experience mental illness should be barred from 
participating in politics, but rather emphasizes the lack of public discussion regarding 
mental thought processes and the refusal to prioritize connection with the self. In 
rejection of this current societal reality, my analysis suggests that perhaps if we put more 
of an emphasis on personal, inner wellbeing for politicians, civil servants, and citizens, 
we would be able to have more confidence in our policy makers, and the future of politics 
for humanity. 
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